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Abstract
The paper deals with time-scaling transformations of dynamical systems. Such scal-
ing functions operate a change of coordinates on the time axis of the system trajectories
preserving its phase portrait. Exploiting this property, a chaos encryption technique to
transmit a binary signal through an analog channel is proposed. The scheme is based
on a suitable time-scaling function which plays the role of a private key. The encoded
transmitted signal is proved to resist known decryption attacks offering a secure and
reliable communication.
Keywords: Chaotic Encryption, Secure Communication, Chaos Synchronization, Time-
Scaling.
1 Introduction
In the last decades, encryption schemes that hide messages in chaotic signals have attracted
attention as a tool to transmit information securely. The basic principle is to conceal the
plaintext message using a chaotic signal and to recover it at the end of the receiver by means
of a synchronization process [Pecora & Carrol, 1990]. In literature many techniques have been
proposed, but they can be mainly divided into three different categories: Chaotic Masking,
Chaotic Shifting Key and Chaotic Modulation.
Chaotic Masking has been the first encryption method introduced in chaotic communications.
Basically, a chaotic signal (the “mask”) is added to the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext.
The synchronized receiver is able to recover the plaintext by simply subtracting the “mask”
[Cuomo & Oppenheim, 1993].
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In Chaotic Modulation a chaotic signal is modulated by the plaintext and the receiver recov-
ers it through an “inversion” process that obviously depends on the modulation technique
[Kolumban et al., 1998].
In a wide sense, Chaotic Shifting Key (CSK) can also be seen as a special case of Chaotic
Modulation. It allows the transmission of a binary signal by switching the parameters of two
different chaotic systems. The receiver determines the bit value according to the success or
failure of its synchronization attempt. Many cryptanalysis tools have been developed in order
to evaluate the security of these schemes and it has been shown that the realization of secure
communications based on chaotic encryption is still a quite difficult and challenging task [Li
et al., 2006].
In this paper we study classes of dynamical systems characterized by having the same phase
diagram, but a different time response. This property reveals to be a useful countermeasure
against known powerful decryption attacks (such as return map attacks). This suggests the
possibility to effectively employ this kind of systems in chaotic communications. However,
analysis of chaotic and, generally, nonlinear systems is quite complex to perform. This is the
reason why an accurate cryptanalysis of communication schemes based on chaos encryption is
difficult to realize and most employed tools are usually numerical simulations. Nevertheless,
this work provides some theoretical results as a support to guarantee security of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the theoretical framework is described and
developed; in Section 3 we propose a CSK scheme for secure communications exploiting time
scaling functions; Section 4 is devoted to some qualitative cryptanalytical considerations and,
finally, we provide some simulation results in Section 5.
2 Time Scaled Systems
Let us consider an autonomous dynamical system described by the differential equation
d
dt
x = f(x) x ∈ ℜn, f : ℜn → ℜn. (1)
We introduce a modified (“time-scaled”) system
d
dt
z = f(z)λ(z, t) z ∈ ℜn, λ : (ℜn ×ℜ)→ ℜ. (2)
where λ is called “time scaling function”. The effect of multiplying all the components of the
function f by the same scalar function is just to modify the time scale of the original system
[Sampei & Furuta, 1978]. The adoption of time scale functions is a quite common analysis tool
in robotics and chemical applications because it gives some advantages in designing feedback
linearizing controllers [Sampei & Furuta, 1978], [Respondek et al., 2003] and, under some
non-restrictive conditions, it does not change the stability properties of the system [Sampei
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& Furuta, 1978]. However, in this work we are also interested into the fact that time scaling
tranformations preserve most topological and geometrical properties of the phase diagram.
For the sake of generality and completeness, we begin considering a time scale transformation
depending both on time t and the state z. We report and prove some theoretical results which
will be helpful for our purposes trying also to give an extensive overview.
Proposition 2.1 (Existence of the time scaled solution). Let us consider systems (1) and
(2). If there exists a solution φx(t, x0) of (1) with initial condition x(0) = x0 and if λ(·, ·) is
“regular enough”, then there exists a scalar function τ(t) such that φx(τ(t), x0) is a solution
for (2) with the same initial value x0.
Proof. By hypothesis, the initial value problem
dz
dτ
= f(z)
z(0) = x0
(3)
admits a solution z(τ) = φx(τ, x0). Consider now
dτ
dt
= λ(z(τ), t)
τ(t0) = τ0.
(4)
If λ(z(τ), t) is “regular enough”, there exists a solution φτ (t, t0, τ0). Let τ(t) := φτ (t, 0, 0), we
can define
φz(t, x0) := φx(τ(t), x0). (5)
By inspection, φz(t, x0) is a trajectory of (2) with t0 = 0 and z(t0) = x0.
We remark that the “regularity” required on the time scale function λ is needed only
to solve the Cauchy Problem (4). Actually, it could be sufficient to assume that λ is a
piecewise locally Lipschitz function which definitely is not a restrective condition. However,
if λ satisfies some additional properties, some more strict relations beetween the original and
the “modified” system can be proved.
Proposition 2.2. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.1 and assuming that ∃ l, L ∈ ℜ such
that 0 < l ≤ λ(z, t) ≤ L, the phase diagrams of the two systems are identical.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Since 0 < l ≤ dτ
dt
≤ L, we can immediately conclude that
τ(t) is continuous, increasing monotonic and therefore invertible on ℜ. This means that every
trajectory {φx(t, x0)|t ∈ ℜ} is completely mapped into the trajectory {φz(t, x0)|t ∈ ℜ}.
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The previous proposition estabilishes a strong bond beetween the two systems. In fact,
even though time responses can be very different, trajectories, attractors and stability prop-
erties of the two systems are exactly the same [Sampei & Furuta, 1978]. It is important to
remark this holds for any kind of attractors, including strange attractors. Such a property
will be exploited in the next section to derive a secure communication scheme.
Proposition 2.3. Let v be a unitary vector in ℜn. Define y(t) = vTx(t). Given two time
instants t1 ≤ t2, assume that {t ∈ [t1, t2]|y˙(t) = 0} is a discrete set. Consider also a time
scale function
λ(z) :=
{
Λ0 if ⌊v
T z/h⌋ is even
Λ1 if ⌊v
T z/h⌋ is odd
(6)
where the symbol ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function. Assume also that
2
(
1
Λ0
+
1
Λ1
)
−1
= 1. (7)
Then, under the conditions of Proposition 2.2
lim
h→0
φz(t2 − t1, x1) = φx(t2 − t1, x1). (8)
Proof. The function λ “slices” ℜn by means of hyperplanes orthogonal to the vector v. In
every “slice” (whose width is equal to h) the time scale is modified through a constant gain
which is, alternatively, Λ0 or Λ1. Figure 1 schematically depicts this situation. With no loss
of generality, we can assume Λ0 ≤ Λ1. Since the harmonic mean (7) of the two values is one,
we have Λ0 ≤ 1 ≤ Λ1. So, the time scaled system “moves” slower than the original one in
those regions where λ(z) = Λ0 and faster where λ(z) = Λ1. However, if those regions are
narrow enough (that means h “small” enough), the trajectory arc ̂x(t1)x(t2) is covered in the
same amount of time by both the original and the scaled system.
3 Application to Chaos Encryption
In this section we will show how two time-scaled chaotic systems can be employed to send
a binary signal in an encrypted manner. In particular, we will use two time-scaled chaotic
systems in a chaotic shifting key (CSK) scheme showing how some security issues can be
solved.
In a basic CSK scheme, the plaintext is encoded as a sequence of chaotic signals produced
by one of two different chaotic systems according to the bit value. The receiver decodes the
ciphertext through a simple on-off synchronization process. Consider the following system
used as the sender
x˙ = f(x, s, θ(m)) (9)
4
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Figure 1: Geometrical interpretation of Proposition 2.3.
where s is a scalar component of the state x and θ(m) is a vector of parameters modulated
by a binary plain signal m(t)
θ = θ(m) =
{
θ0 if m = 0
θ1 if m = 1.
(10)
Both θ0 and θ1 must have been suitably chosen to generate a chaotic regime in (9). To transmit
m(t), the signal s(t) is sent out in order to cause synchronization to the receiver
z˙ = f(z, s, θ1). (11)
If synchronization is achieved the bit is revealed to be 1, while, if there is no synchronization,
the bit is concluded to be 0. The security of the system is based on the fact that an intruder
would observe only the “apparently meaningless” chaotic signal s(t) and should not be able
to achieve synchronization without an accurate knowledge of the parameters θ0 and θ1 which
play the role of a private key. Nevertheless, this basic scheme has been proved to be very
vulnerable to Return Map attacks [Li et al., 2006]. In fact, assuming that xi and Xi are the
i− th minima and maxima, respectively, of s, we define the following variables Ai := Xi + xi
and Bi := Xi − xi. The plot of Bi as a function of Ai is called Return Map (RM) of the
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signal s. The RM is topologically equivalent to the peak to peak dynamics plot described
in [Candaten & Rinaldi, 2000]. An intruder, observing the encrypted signal s(t), can easily
reconstruct the RM with no knowledge of the parameters θ0 or θ1. In fact, if the two RMs
of system (9) when θ = θ0 and when θ = θ1 are “well distinguishable”, it is possible to
unmask the concealed bit simply checking which map the transmitter is currently tuned on.
An example of a RM reconstruction is reported in Figure 2. In this case the obtained RM
shows two evident branches, one is associated to θ0 and the other one to θ1 . The intruder,
by simply checking what branch the transmitted signal is currently associated, can easily
recover the plaintext sampled at every peak. Of course, the presence of channel noise would
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
PSfrag replacements
Ai
B
i
Figure 2: Two different values of the parameter θ in a CSK scheme can produce two distin-
guishable return maps.
disturb the attacker because he would obtain blurred maps. At the same time, we have
to consider that noise would produce negative consequences on the receiver synchronization
process, too. Many countermeasures have been considered in order to resist RM attacks (such
as [Bu & Wang, 2004], [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001]), and many of them have been
broken, as well [Li et al., 2006]. In [Xu & Chee, 2004] a very interesting approach has been
proposed where the parameter θ still switches according to the plain-text bit value, but some
more additional random switches are introduced to confuse a possible intruder. In this case,
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the switching policy (10) is extended to the following form
θ = θ(x,m) (12)
The additional pseudo-random switches occur according to one or more state variables (that
are not transmitted), such that they do not disturb the receiver when it is in a synchronized
condition. Conversely, this is novelty of the idea, an attacker trying to reconstruct the RM
will be frustrated by the presence of many switches s/he is not able to predict because they
are intrinsically related to the knowledge of the system structure. However, it is our opinion
that the pseudo-random switch approach, in its general form described in [Xu & Chee, 2004],
is still structurally vulnerable to RM attacks, if some precautions are not taken. Moreover,
there are no theoretical results to guarantee that the reconstructed RM can not actually be
exploited by an attacker.
3.1 Time Scale CSK scheme
The Time Scale CSK (TS-CSK) communication scheme we propose is partially inspired by
[Xu & Chee, 2004], but it adopts time scaling functions to prevent the system to be broken
by standard return map attacks. The transmitter and receiver have the following structure
x˙ = f(x, s)λ(x,m)
z˙ = f(z, s)λ(z, 1)
(13)
where s is one of the state components which is being transmitted and λ(x,m) is the strictly
positive time scaling function
λ(x,m) =
{
Λm if ⌊v
T z/h⌋ is even
Λ1−m if ⌊v
T z/h⌋ is odd
}
(14)
such that Λ0, Λ1, v and h are fixed parameters chosen to meet condition of Proposition 2.3
which play .the role of the encryption key. In this case, the function λ defines a time-scale
analogous to the time-scale described in Proposition 2.3 where the transmitted bit m simply
inverts the roles of Λ0 and Λ1. This choice of λ is very demonstrative and it is motivated
by its simplicity and by the theoretical results proved in the previous section. This peculiar
structure allows to carry out some qualitative cryptanalytical considerations. Of course, a
more sophisticated choice could bring to better results in terms of security, synchronization
time and practical realization.
4 TS-CSK Cryptanalysis
In this section we will analyze how the proposed TS-CSK communication scheme can resist
most common decryption attacks. This study does not intend to be an exhaustive cryptanal-
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ysis since this can only be be accomplished describing the exact typology of attacks (known
plaintext, known ciphertext, etc...). It is our aim to report only some qualitative considera-
tions supported, when possible, by theoretical results.
4.1 Return Map attack
The communication system (13) is intrinsecally robust against a return map attack. In fact,
from Proposition 2.2, it is obvious that, under practically non-restrictive conditions on f and
λ, neither the modulation m nor the pseudo-random switches modify the phase portrait of
the original non-timed scaled system
x˙ = f(x, s). (15)
Therefore, the RMs of the TS-CSK scheme (13) and system (15) are exactly the same regard-
less of the transmitted bit m(t).
4.2 Return Time Map attack
Assuming that Xi is the i− th local maximum of s(t) and ti is the relative time instant when
it occurs, we define the Return Time Map (RTM) as the plot of ti+1 − ti versus Xi. With no
conceptual differences, the RTM could have been defined using the minima of s(t) (or both
minima and maxima) [Candaten & Rinaldi, 2000]. The effect of the function λ is to “speed
up” the system when λ > 1 and to “slow down” it when λ < 1. It is intuitive that a wrong
choice of the function λ could lead to a breakable system using a RTM attack [Candaten
& Rinaldi, 2000].
By Proposition 2.3 it is immediate to conclude that if the number of time scaling switches is
“dense” enough (with a proper choice of λ), then the RTM plot is not “significantly” modified
by the time scaling. Of course, this is just a theoretical consideration, since the choice of a too
small value for h would negate the possibility of a physical realization of such communication
devices. However, Proposition 2.3 confirms the intuition suggesting small values for h in order
to increase the security of the system.
4.3 Switch detection
In a CSK scheme, an intruder eavesdropping the communication could detect the changes of
bit values by simply detecting discontinuities in the first derivative of the encoded signal s(t).
This is the reason why the adoption of a continuous function λ is deprecated. In fact, it would
not create discontinuous false-switches analogous to the informative bit switches in order to
confuse the intruder [Xu & Chee, 2004]. If false-switches are frequent enough in time and do
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not depend on the drive signal it will be difficult to distinguish which ones will be informative.
Again, the choice of small values for h seems to lead to increased security.
4.4 Brute Force attack
In a security analysis, it must be assumed that the intruder knows everything about the
communication system structure, encryption method, physical characteristics (channel noise
power spectrum etc...) but the encryption key. Nevertheless, the encryption key can be
guessed, so it is important the key space is large enough in order to make such a guess the
most difficult it is possible. A common problem in chaos communication is the fact that
physical systems show a chaotic behaviour only in a very restricted range of their parameters
limiting the choice of the key. The proposed approach, in its general form (13), overcomes
this problem since there is no particular restriction on the function λ once it is assumed it is
discontinuous and strictly positive.
5 Example
The communication system Pseudo Random Switch CSK (PRS-CSK) described in [Xu & Chee,
2004] exploits the well-known synchronization properties of two identical Lorenz models
[Pecora & Carrol, 1990]
x˙1 = σ(x2 − x1)
x˙2 = (β − x3)x1 − x2
x˙3 = x1x2 − ρx3
s = x1
(16)
z˙1 = σ(z2 − z1)
z˙2 = (β0 − z3)s− z2
z˙3 = z2s− ρz3
where θ(x,m) = [σ, β(m), ρ(x)]. The parameter β is modulated the plain-text signal m(t)
β(m) =
{
β0 if m = 0
β1 if m = 1
(17)
while the parameter ρ generates the false switching events
ρ = ρ(x) =

b1 if a1 < x2 < a2
b2 if a3 < x2 < a4
b3 if a5 < x2 < a6
b4 if a7 < x2 < a8
b5 otherwise
(18)
In [Xu & Chee, 2004] the numerical choice of the variables was
σ = 10
β0 = 60.5
β1 = 60
a = [0, 5, 31, 32, 23, 28, 10, 16]
b = [10/3, 8/3, 2/3, 5/3, 2].
(19)
The transmission of 100 alternate bits (worst case scenario for the attacker) (as in [Xu & Chee,
2004]) has been simulated assuming the absence of channel noise using a standard ODE45
integration method with a relative tolerance of 1e − 12 in order to obtain a low numerical
noise. The result of the RM reconstructed by an eventual attacker is depicted in Figure 3. As
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Figure 3: The Return Map of the PRS-CSK scheme (16), assuming no noise acting on che
channel, still presents two distinct branches even adopting the pseudo-random switching CSK.
it is shown, in the RM two branches are still distinguishible even though they are definetely
close. However, the close distance of the two branches is mainly related to the fact that the
two values β0 and β1 are pretty similar. In a practical situation, the two branches would be
very likely undistinguishable because of channel noise, but, as we have previously stressed, the
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presence of noise may disturb the receiver synchronization as well. A theoretical guarantee
that a RM attack is really ineffective would be desirable from the security point of view.
As a comparison, we employ the same Lorenz model in a TS-CSK communication scheme
x˙1 = [σ(x2 − x1)]λ(x,m)
x˙2 = [(β − x3)x1 − x2]λ(x,m)
x˙3 = [x1x2 − ρx3]λ(x,m)
s = x1 (20)
z˙1 = [σ(z2 − z1)]λ(z, 1)
z˙2 = [(β − z3)s− z2]λ(z, 1)
z˙3 = [z2s− ρz3]λ(z, 1)
with σ = 10, β = 60, ρ = 2 and using λ(x,m) in (14) with the private encryption/decryption
key
v = [0, 1, 0]T
h = 2
Λ0 = 15/16
Λ1 = 15/14.
Figure 4 shows the Lorenz attractor projected on the plane x1-x2 along with the time-scale
policy. Given the bit m to be transmitted, in the white stripes the system evolves with the
time-scale factor Λm while in the gray ones the time-scale factor Λ1−m is used. System (20)
has been simulated with the transmission of 100 alternate bits (ODE45 solver with relative
precision equal to 1e−12). The corresponding RM and RTM obtained by an eventual intruder
are reported in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Return Map Attack is completely countered
since the RM of the the sender dynamics does not change according to the bit value. Moreover,
a RTM based attack does not seem to be so effective because the map is sparse enough not
to reveal the presence of distinct branches (we are implicitly assuming that the integration
error in the simulation procedure can be safely neglected). In order to show that the proposed
scheme can provide a secure and reliable communication, Figure 7 depicts the simulation
results of the decryption phase at the receiver. Ten alternate bits have been encoded and the
right synchronizations/desynchronizations occur very promptly.
6 Conclusion
An encryption scheme to send digital data through an analog channel has been introduced
by exploiting a class of time scaling functions. It has been proved that such a scheme is
11
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
PSfrag replacements
x1
x
2
Figure 4: Projection of the Lorenz attractor on the plane x1-x2 for the TS-CSK scheme.
intrinsecally secure against simple return map attacks. Some theoretical results show that
return time map attacks should not be so effective, too, if the choice of the time-scaling func-
tion satisfies some requirements. Switch detection beetween bits in the plaintext is also made
difficult by using a pseudo-random false-switching technique. Simulations show effectiveness
of the proposed communication scheme with respect to known decryption attacks.
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